Post-Soviet Revival (1988–Present)

The celebrations of the Millennium of the Baptism of Rus’ in 1988 marked the beginning of an extraordinary revival of the Russian Orthodox Church. From a persecuted, diminished institution, the Church has become once again the largest religious body in Russia, rebuilding thousands of churches and monasteries, canonizing the New Martyrs, and reuniting with ROCOR in 2007. This revival has also raised difficult questions about the Church’s relationship with the Russian state and its role in contemporary geopolitics.

Tradition: Russian Orthodox (with ROCOR-specific significance noted)

The 1988 Millennium as Turning Point

The celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’ in June 1988 was a watershed moment. Under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), the Soviet government permitted — and even participated in — celebrations that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier.

Key events of the Millennium celebrations:

A council (Pomestny Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church was held at the Trinity-Sergius Lavra on June 6–9, 1988, which canonized nine new saints: Grand Prince Dimitry Donskoy, Andrei Rublev, Maximus the Greek, Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow, Paisius Velichkovsky, Blessed Xenia of St. Petersburg, Ignatius Brianchaninov, Ambrose of Optina, and Theophan the Recluse.
Gorbachev met with Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod in April 1988 — the first meeting between a Soviet leader and the Church’s leadership since Stalin’s 1943 meeting.
The St. Daniel (Danilov) Monastery in Moscow, returned to the Church in 1983 and restored as the Patriarchate’s administrative center, served as the center of celebrations.
International guests, media attention, and public celebrations signaled the end of the era of active persecution.

(Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy, ch. 1; Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, vol. 2, epilogue)

The Legal Framework: Freedom of Religion

The 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience

The USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (October 1, 1990) was the first Soviet legislation to grant genuine religious freedom:

Religious organizations were granted the status of legal persons for the first time since 1918.
The right to own property, publish literature, conduct charitable work, and teach religion was restored.
Restrictions on religious education and missionary activity were lifted.
Clergy and believers were granted equal civil rights.

The 1997 Russian Law on Freedom of Conscience

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation adopted a new law on religion in 1997 (Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations). This law was controversial because:

It established a distinction between “traditional” religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism) and other religious groups.
Non-traditional groups faced registration requirements and restrictions.
The Russian Orthodox Church was named in the preamble as having played a special role in Russian history.
Critics argued that the law created a de facto privileged position for the Russian Orthodox Church and restricted genuine religious pluralism.

(Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church, ch. 3; Shterin and Richardson, “Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia’s New National Law,” Journal of Church and State 40, no. 2 (1998): 319–341)

Church Rebuilding and Institutional Growth

The scale of the Church’s institutional recovery since 1988 has been remarkable:

Churches: From approximately 6,800 functioning parishes in 1988, the number had grown to 38,649 churches and other places where the Liturgy is celebrated by the beginning of 2019 (Patriarch Kirill’s report to the Bishops’ Conference, Moscow Patriarchate, 2019). Thousands of churches have been rebuilt, restored, or newly constructed.
The Cathedral of Christ the Savior: The most symbolically significant rebuilding project was the reconstruction of Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, originally built in the nineteenth century and dynamited on Stalin’s orders in 1931. It was rebuilt between 1995 and 2000, largely funded by public donation and state support.
Monasteries: From about 21 functioning monasteries in 1988 to 972 (474 men’s and 498 women’s) by the beginning of 2019 (Patriarch Kirill’s report to the Bishops’ Conference, Moscow Patriarchate, 2019).
Theological education: Theological academies and seminaries have been reopened and expanded. New institutions have been founded, including the Orthodox University of St. Tikhon in Moscow (established 1992).
Social and charitable work: The Church has developed extensive social services, including hospitals, orphanages, addiction treatment programs, prison chaplaincy, and homeless shelters.
Media: The Church operates television channels, radio stations, publishing houses, and an extensive internet presence.

(Patriarch Kirill, report to the Bishops’ Conference, Moscow, 2019 [statistics published by the Moscow Patriarchate, mospat.ru]; Chapnin, “A Church of Empire,” First Things, November 2015)

Canonization of the New Martyrs and Royal Martyrs (2000)

The Jubilee Council (Arkhiereisky Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church, held in August 2000, was one of the most significant events in the Church’s modern history. Its most consequential act was the canonization of the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia — those who suffered and died for the faith under Soviet persecution.

The New Martyrs

The council canonized more than a thousand named New Martyrs and Confessors (some 860 newly examined cases together with roughly 230 previously locally venerated saints entered into the all-church calendar), representing the much larger host of unnamed victims. This canonization had been preceded by ROCOR’s canonization of the New Martyrs in 1981, which the Moscow Patriarchate had not then been able to follow due to Soviet constraints.

The canonization affirmed that:

The Soviet persecution constituted a genuine martyrdom comparable to the persecutions of the early Church.
The faith and courage of those who died or suffered for Christ bore witness to the continuing power of the Gospel.
The New Martyrs are intercessors before God for the Russian Church and people.

The Royal Martyrs

The most controversial aspect of the 2000 canonization was the glorification of the Royal Family — Tsar Nicholas II, Tsarina Alexandra, Tsarevich Alexei, and Grand Duchesses Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia — who were murdered by the Bolsheviks in Yekaterinburg on the night of July 16/17, 1918.

The Moscow Patriarchate canonized them as Passion-Bearers (strastoterpitsy), a category of sainthood (see The Baptism of Rus’ on Sts. Boris and Gleb) that emphasizes their acceptance of suffering and death in a Christ-like spirit, without necessarily making a political judgment about Nicholas’s reign.

ROCOR had canonized the Royal Family in 1981 as Martyrs (mucheniki), a stronger category implying death specifically for the faith. This difference in categorization reflects genuine theological disagreement about whether the Royal Family was killed specifically for their Orthodox faith or for political reasons, though the distinction has been somewhat blurred in practice.

(The Acts of the Jubilee Bishops’ Council, August 13–16, 2000; Slater, The Many Deaths of Tsar Nicholas II: Relics, Remains and the Romanovs, 2007)

The 2007 Reunion with ROCOR

On May 17, 2007, the Act of Canonical Communion was signed in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, reuniting the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) with the Moscow Patriarchate after over 80 years of separation.

Background

The separation had been caused by the Soviet regime’s interference in church governance (particularly Metropolitan Sergius’s Declaration of 1927) and the impossibility of free communication between the emigre Church and the Church in Russia. ROCOR had maintained its independence as a necessary measure of self-preservation, refusing to accept the authority of a Patriarchate it viewed as compromised by Soviet control (see Soviet Persecution).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the conditions that had necessitated the separation no longer existed in the same form. Dialogue between ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate began in the early 2000s, led on the Moscow side by Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) of Smolensk (later Patriarch) and on the ROCOR side by Metropolitan Laurus (Skurla).

Terms of Reunion

The Act of Canonical Communion restored Eucharistic communion between ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate while preserving ROCOR’s internal self-governance:

ROCOR retained its own synod, its own administrative structure, and its liturgical and pastoral practices.
ROCOR bishops would commemorate the Patriarch of Moscow in their liturgical services.
The Moscow Patriarchate recognized the validity of ROCOR’s canonizations (including the New Martyrs and the Royal Family, canonized by ROCOR in 1981).
ROCOR recognized the Moscow Patriarchate as the legitimate canonical authority of the Russian Church.

Controversy

The reunion was not without opposition:

Within ROCOR, a minority refused to accept the reunion, arguing that the Moscow Patriarchate remained tainted by Sergianism and ecumenism. Several bishops and communities broke away, forming splinter groups.
Some in the Moscow Patriarchate were uncomfortable with ROCOR’s anti-ecumenist positions and stricter stance on inter-Orthodox and inter-Christian relations.
The reunion has been tested by subsequent events, particularly the war in Ukraine (see below).

(The Act of Canonical Communion, May 17, 2007, official text published by the Moscow Patriarchate and ROCOR; documentation of the reunion process and its opponents at rocorstudies.org)

Current State and Challenges

The Church and the Russian State

The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Federation has been characterized by a de facto (though not de jure) “symphonia” — a close alliance between church and state. Under Patriarch Kirill (elected 2009), the Church has:

Supported and received support from the Russian government in various spheres (education, military chaplaincy, public morality legislation).
Been granted privileges such as the return of historic church properties, access to public schools for “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” classes, and a prominent public role.
Provided religious legitimation for state policies, including military actions.

Critics — both within and outside the Orthodox world — have accused the Moscow Patriarchate of excessive closeness to the Kremlin, drawing parallels to the Synodal period’s subordination of the Church to the state or to the Sergianist pattern of trading spiritual freedom for institutional security.

Defenders argue that the Church is navigating a complex post-Soviet situation, that cooperation with the state is a legitimate form of the “symphonia” model traditional to Orthodox countries, and that the Church has used its influence to promote genuine spiritual and social goods (education, charity, restoration of churches and cultural heritage).

The War in Ukraine and Ecclesial Consequences

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine beginning in 2014 (annexation of Crimea, conflict in the Donbas) and the full-scale invasion launched on February 24, 2022, have had profound consequences for the Orthodox world:

The Ukrainian autocephaly crisis: In 2018–2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), formed from previously non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox groups. The Moscow Patriarchate rejected this as a violation of its canonical territory and broke communion with Constantinople. This rupture remains the most serious schism in the Orthodox world.
Patriarch Kirill’s support for the war: Patriarch Kirill has been widely criticized for providing religious justification for the invasion of Ukraine, including describing the conflict in quasi-theological terms. This has damaged the Moscow Patriarchate’s international standing and alienated many Orthodox, including some within ROCOR.
Impact on ROCOR: ROCOR’s position has been complicated by the war. While ROCOR is canonically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, many ROCOR members (especially in Western countries) are deeply uncomfortable with Patriarch Kirill’s statements on the war. ROCOR’s official communications have called for prayer and peace without endorsing the war: Metropolitan Hilarion (Kapral) issued an epistle on February 24, 2022 calling the faithful to prayer for the suffering in Ukraine; the Synod’s chancery stated on March 24, 2022 that commemoration of Patriarch Kirill would continue while ROCOR organized aid for refugees through the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church; and the Synod has issued statements in support of the persecuted canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry. Some European hierarchs, notably Metropolitan Mark of Berlin, have publicly called for the war to stop immediately (statements compiled at orthodoxlife.org and rocorstudies.org; as of 2023).
Defections from Moscow: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) — long the largest church body in Ukraine — declared “full independence and self-governance” from the Moscow Patriarchate at a council in May 2022, though the canonical implications of this declaration remain disputed.

These events continue to unfold, and their long-term consequences for Russian Orthodoxy, ROCOR, and pan-Orthodox unity remain unclear.

(Denysenko, The Orthodox Church in Ukraine; Hovorun, Political Orthodoxies: The Unorthodoxies of the Church Coerced, 2018; various news sources)

References

Chapnin, Sergei. “A Church of Empire.” First Things, November 2015.
Davis, Nathaniel. A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003.
Denysenko, Nicholas. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2018.
Hovorun, Cyril. Political Orthodoxies: The Unorthodoxies of the Church Coerced. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2018.
Knox, Zoe. Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia After Communism. London: Routledge, 2005.
Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev). Report to the Bishops’ Conference of the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow, 2019; statistics published by the Moscow Patriarchate (mospat.ru).
Pospielovsky, Dimitry V. The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917–1982. 2 vols. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984.
ROCOR Synod of Bishops. Statements on the war in Ukraine and the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 2022–2023 (synod.com; compiled at orthodoxlife.org and rocorstudies.org).
Shterin, Marat S., and James T. Richardson. “Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia’s New National Law.” Journal of Church and State 40, no. 2 (1998): 319–341.
Slater, Wendy. The Many Deaths of Tsar Nicholas II: Relics, Remains and the Romanovs. London: Routledge, 2007.
The Act of Canonical Communion between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, May 17, 2007.
Ware, Timothy (Kallistos). The Orthodox Church. New edition. London: Penguin, 1993.